Fix PRNG seeding to resist guessing
We seed it with value of time(). It's the traditional way, but it
provides only a few bits of effective entropy when an attacker has a
rough idea when the program started.
Instead, seed with a kernel random number. If we can't get one, fall
back to a hash of gettimeofday() and getpid(). This should happen
only on old systems or Windows. Far worse than a kernel random
number, but far better than using time().
Note that fairland used to seed with time() + getpid() until commit
331aac2a
(v4.2.20) dropped the getpid(), claiming it didn't improve
the randomness. Perhaps it didn't under Windows then, but it
certainly did elsewhere, so it was a regression.
This commit is contained in:
parent
39c26f4238
commit
9102ecce54
4 changed files with 68 additions and 2 deletions
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@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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char *config_file = NULL;
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int force_bad_state = 0;
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int op, idx, sig;
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unsigned seed = time(NULL);
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unsigned seed = 0;
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int seed_set = 0;
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oops_handler = ignore;
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@ -194,6 +195,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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break;
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case 'R':
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seed = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
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seed_set = 1;
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break;
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case 'v':
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printf("%s\n\n%s", version, legal);
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@ -254,6 +256,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
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return install_service(program_name, service_name, config_file);
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#endif /* _WIN32 */
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if (!seed_set)
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seed = pick_seed();
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init_server(seed, force_bad_state);
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#if defined(_WIN32)
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